an American manifestation of the imperialism of free trade. Thereafter, Williams's former students expanded upon his laissez-faire open-door speculations. In 1963, for example, Walter LaFeber fleshed out the Gilded Age origins of the Open Door in The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898, arguing that American late nineteenth-century imperialism arose owing to growing national demand for foreign markets as a cure-all to the era's economic depression, overproduction, and domestic political conflicts.
9 Upon The New Empire's thirtyfifth anniversary rerelease, Diane Kunz observed that it had since become "the prevailing academic orthodoxy" as an American continuation of Gallagher and Robinson's "imperialism of free trade" legacy.
10 Ernest May, although generally critical of the revisionist emphasis on economic imperialism, suggested that their utilization of the Gallagher-Robinson informal imperial thesis might be even more applicable within the Progressive Era-an era that witnessed the development of "corporate capitalism," what Michael Hogan describes as an evolving compromise "between the older laissez-faire system . . . and paternalistic statism."
11 The "imperialism of free trade" argument has since been utilized within various turn-of-the-century U.S. foreign relations histories in the Wisconsin School's revisionist tradition, which continues to hold a prominent position within the study of U.S. imperialism. Tariff Policy, 1897 -1912 (Chapel Hill, 1992 . It should be noted that, while subscribing to the revisionist narrative of bipartisan imperial expansion during this period, Tom Terrill and Ed Crapol do emphasize instead an economic nationalist drive to empire. See Tom Terrill, The Tariff, Politics, and American Foreign Policy, 1874 (Westport, 1973 and Edward P. Crapol, America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia, 1876 -1896 (Westport, 1973 . The historiographical influence of revisionist imperial scholarship stems in no small part from its provocative narrative of bipartisan American empire building. Open-door imperial histories explicitly minimize politico-ideological conflict between and within the Democratic and Republican parties over the question of American imperial expansion. Consequently, American free traders-previously considered among the most vocal critics of American imperialism-have been recast as advocates of informal imperialism.
12 In explaining the latter, Williams termed the seeming contradiction "imperial anticolonialism," and various other revisionists have likewise suggested that the difference between Republican imperial presidents and so-called anti-imperial commercial expansionists such as Democratic President Grover Cleveland was merely one of tactics.
13
Revisionists thus sought to demonstrate that both sides of the aisle ultimately found common ground when seeking an American open-door empire, despite the existence of oppositional politico-economic ideologies, intraparty infighting, and rabid partisanship.
The continued salience of the revisionist open-door thesis also owes much to the cultural turn within U.S. imperial historiography, which has borne witness to a variety of innovative gendered and racial studies of America's rise to empire at the turn of the century. Because of their cultural focus, however, these studies have largely ceded the economic imperial impetus to the revisionists. In Barbarian Virtues, for example, Matthew Frye Jacobson remarks upon how he remains "struck by the remarkable freshness and staying power" of the open-door imperial interpretation, and Kristin Hoganson similarly grants in her work on turn-of-thecentury imperial gender politics that the open-door thesis played a prominent part in creating an American empire, albeit with the caveat that "commercial ambition alone" cannot explain turn-of-the-century American imperialism. 14 12. Lewis L. Gould, "Tariffs and Markets in the Gilded Age," Reviews in American History 2 (June 1974): 266-71. Subsequent work focusing upon American trade expansion within the broader history of modern globalization has ably complemented-but has not supplanted-the "strongly influential" open-door revisionist narrative.
15
But a more systemic reason for the long-term success of U.S. free-trade imperial revisionism stems from the all too common laissez-faire mischaracterization of the American turn of the century, a shining example of what William Novak has described as "the myth of the 'weak' American state." 16 Aside from minimal governmental regulation of monopolies and industrial practices, however, the Gilded Age was by no means a laissez-faire period of free trade and governmental noninterference in the national market. Instead, economic nationalism prevailed upon the American political economy, including massive governmental intervention to protect the home market through high protective tariffs, immigration restrictions, "infant" industrial subsidization, internal improvements, and governmental land redistribution.
17 After the Civil War, economic nationalist ideology subsumed the Republican Party. Free-trade advocacy in the United States correspondingly became tantamount to conspiracy owing to real and (Chapel Hill, 2004) . Paul Kramer innovatively incorporates Gallagher and Robinson's subsequent "collaborator thesis" in The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines (Chapel Hill, 2006) . perceived hemispheric geopolitical weakness, an erratic boom-bust economic cycle, and perceptions of British free-trade imperialism at work in Latin America, the Asia Pacific, and even the United States itself.
18 Painting the subsequent Progressive Era with the "laissez-faire" brush proves even more problematic, as the period witnessed a sizeable shift toward federal regulation of labor and industry, while simultaneously maintaining high tariff protectionism and other forms of economic nationalist legislation at home and abroad.
Therefore, debunking the laissez-faire myth allows for a much-needed reconceptualization of American imperialism from 1890 to 1913.
19 Economic nationalism and ideological discord dominated the U.S. political economy and Republican foreign policy making at the turn of the century. The Republican Party, the party of protectionism, found itself riven by internal disagreements over the future course for the protectionist system and U.S. imperial expansion. From within Republican protectionist ranks arose a progressive wing that increasingly looked beyond the home market for the country's growing agricultural and manufacturing surpluses.
20 They did so against staunch anti-imperial opposition not only from Democratic President Grover Cleveland and American free-trade independents, but also from the Republican Party's isolationist homemarket protectionists, who yet feared or disdained foreign markets and colonial acquisitions. These progressive Republican proponents of empire combined coercive trade reciprocity with protectionism-an expansive closed door-and struggled for control of Republican foreign policy from the Harrison to the Taft administrations. Implementation of the imperialism of economic nationalism began in earnest following the McKinley Tariff's passage in 1890. In direct 21 The Republican Party's progressive turn-of-the-century economic nationalist program stood out from earlier mercantilist imperial enterprises, however, owing to its revolutionary combination of high protective tariffs, a militant desire for foreign markets, and a coercive expansionist policy of retaliatory reciprocity.
Although early stirrings could be felt in the quarter century after the U.S. Civil War, the Republican Party's imperialism of economic nationalism visibly manifested itself in 1890 with the passage of the highly protective McKinley Tariff, just as the American West was reaching the end of Frederick Jackson Turner's continental Frontier, and even as American missionaries were helping to spread informal U.S. networks throughout the globe. 24 The McKinley Tariff's reciprocity provision correspondingly had sturdy protectionist strings attached. While it provided for the admittance of some agricultural goods from South American countries on an individual basis in return for their own duty-free acceptance of U.S. goods, the bill also allowed for the president to raise rates in retaliation if a country offered unequal reciprocal rates. Such retaliatory reciprocity-the Republican protectionist "trump card," as American Cobdenite Edward Atkinson called it-stood in contrast to the reciprocity policy advocated by free traders, who were quick to point out that Republican reciprocity encouraged discrimination and retaliation instead of laying the groundwork for further liberalization of trade.
25
Blaine and his supporters first had to persuade recalcitrant home-market Republican protectionists to support the insertion of the reciprocity provision into the McKinley bill by explaining that it would at once help maintain the protectionist system and expand American access to foreign markets. Blaine encountered initial intraparty opposition from numerous congressional Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee. Blaine attempted to assuage their fears for the home market by pointing to the massive opposition to Republican-style reciprocity from American free traders, showing that free trade was receiving "a most severe blow," and that any protectionist opposing reciprocity in its current form "knocks away one of the strongest supports of his system. The enactment of reciprocity is the safeguard of protection. The defeat of reciprocity," he hammered home, "is the opportunity of free trade." Republican politician Robert La Follette recalled being most surprised by "the misunderstanding in many minds of the Republican doctrine of reciprocity . . . as expounded by Blaine," when it was so clearly "a kind of double protection for American industries-protection of the home market against foreigners, and extension of the foreign market for Americans." McKinley himself ultimately described the tariff as "protective in every paragraph, and American in every line and word. It recognized and fully enforced the economic principle of protection, which the Republican party from its birth had steadfastly advocated." It was also just as Harrison had wanted: a system of reciprocity that did not "attack the protective system."
26
Following the successful addition of the retaliatory reciprocity provision, the McKinley Tariff represented an indelible mark of progress for future American economic nationalist imperial expansion. It appeared that enough protectionists were finally coming to recognize the maturation of American industry that they overruled the anti-reciprocity Republican opposition, those home-market protectionists still unwilling or unable to admit that some of America's once-infant industries had now grown up enough to need foreign markets alongside domestic. Following the passage of the McKinley Tariff, restrictive and retaliatory reciprocity would become a recurring and controversial theme in U.S. protectionist legislation. In 1890, the decades-long, progressive, economic nationalist era of Republican tariff policy-protectionism mixed with restrictive reciprocity-had begun in earnest.
Soon after the McKinley Tariff's enactment, more orthodox home-market protectionists duly fell under Blaine's reciprocal spell. The New York Times reported that within a year after the bill's passage, for example, the Tariff Protection League's news organ came to understand Blaine's "largeness of view," after initially condemning his reciprocity scheme as a traitorous assassination of protectionist principles. Nor, the Times noted, was the league alone in its conversion: "Now the same high-tariff journals talk . . . glibly in praise of those projects . . . they strive to soften the ire of dissatisfied Republicans by pointing out the beauties of 'reciprocity'," Such shifting sentiments did not come about, however, because Blaine was appealing to the Republican Party's "free trade sentiment," to establish a "free trade zone," or out of a desire for an informal freetrade empire as revisionist historian Steve Topik has suggested in his Brazilian case study of the McKinley Tariff. It was quite the opposite-by the 1890s, Republican ranks were effectively devoid of free-trade sentiment. American Democratic and independent free traders, on the other hand, were outraged at the Republican Party's successful protectionist cooptation of "reciprocity," a term that for so long had been identified with free trade.
27
The 1890 McKinley Tariff sent political-economic shockwaves throughout the globe, from England to Australia, and sparked corresponding global demands for protectionist retaliation and British imperial federation. The new tariff also allowed for enlarged American power in the Western Hemisphere, and the possible undermining of the British Empire's North and South American spheres of influence. Canadian-American relations further deteriorated, for instance, when Republican Anglophobes nixed plans to develop CanadianAmerican reciprocity under the McKinley Tariff provision. Many in Canada and England thus suspected that the new Republican tariff was designed specifically to annex Canada, an annexationist sentiment James Blaine himself had expressed.
28
Blaine's closed-door Pan-American vision for extending American economic influence over Latin America further accentuated the Harrison administration's expansionist closed-door designs for the Western Hemisphere. It also further exemplified the Anglophobic sentiment that permeated the turn-of-the-century American political arena. Republican protectionists were especially fearful of Britain's pronounced advantages in the way of industrial production, and both major political parties remained wary of the British Empire's geopolitical presence in the Western Hemisphere.
29 It was no coincidence, therefore, that Blaine's Pan-American conference was convened in Washington, DC from 1889 to mid- 1890, right around when McKinley's new tariff bill was making its way through Congress. The former had been a pet project of Blaine's for some time, stemming from his desire to see Britain's influence in North and South America replaced by that of the United States. Laughlin and Willis observed in their detailed contemporary study of American reciprocity that the conference promised to create a closed Western Hemispheric trading block: a coercive customs union that "would have meant practically that we had succeeded in forcing our tariff system upon the smaller countries associated with us" and would have secured their markets "as a field for the sale of our manufactures." The Pan-American Conference thus was a decidedly protectionist enterprise that, if successful, would have complemented the McKinley Tariff and would also have excluded Canada and the British West Indies. Blaine's desired Western Hemispheric preferential trading zone would thus have minimized commercial competition from Europe and Asia through the adoption of hemispheric-wide high tariff walls, while allowing American exports privileged access to Latin American markets through the establishment of retaliatory reciprocal trade. Through the reciprocity agreements, the Latin American signatories' excess raw materials would in turn have received privileged access to U.S. markets. Although Blaine's conference fell into shambles, he would soon procure some of his desired Latin American reciprocal agreements between 1891 and 1892 through the McKinley Tariff's retaliatory reciprocity provision.
30
In the wake of the McKinley Tariff's passage and the failure of Blaine's PanAmerican Conference, the Harrison administration's imperial designs for Hawaii bore more fruit, or at least more sugar.
31 The McKinley Tariff proved instrumental in triggering the Hawaiian revolution in January 1893. Since 1876, the United States had established exclusive reciprocal trade relations with Hawaii, and, since 1884, a coaling station at Pearl Harbor in order to take advantage of Hawaii's possible strategic and commercial role in accessing the long-sought Asia Market.
32
The McKinley Tariff ended this earlier agreement, which had the effect of displacing Hawaiian sugar from its favored position of unfettered access to the protected U.S. market. The new tariff also granted a substantial bounty to American sugar producers, further incentivizing annexationist sentiment in Hawaii. The change in policy precipitated an economic depression in Hawaii, as sugar made up 93 percent of the country's exports. Hawaii's revolutionary leaders-predominantly U.S. businessmen-believed that only American annexation could solve the myriad problems surrounding the islands' depressed sugar trade and Queen Liliukalani's power grab. Blaine, his June 1892 State Department successor John Foster, and Harrison himself were more than happy to oblige the Hawaiian annexationists.
33
The Harrison administration backed up its support for the Hawaiian annexationists with naval power. U.S. sailors landed on Hawaiian shores to protect American property and to intimidate the royalists in mid-January 1893. The queen was deposed the next day. Blaine's State Department replacement, John W. Foster, desired speedy annexation, and crafted a treaty that he hoped the Senate might ratify before Harrison stepped down from office in early March. The treaty was nevertheless stalled in the Senate, and was soon to be undone by the incoming Democratic administration of Grover Cleveland. Further implementation of the imperialism of economic nationalism would have to wait. Revisionist scholarship has struggled to fit the nonconsecutive Democratic administrations of Grover Cleveland (1885-1889, 1893-1897) into its free-trade imperial paradigm. In trying to force Cleveland into the Open Door, for example, W. A. Williams called him and other critics of Republican imperialism "so-called" antiimperialists, and suggested that proponents of laissez-faire naturally sanctioned economic expansion, which for Williams was synonymous with imperialism. He depicted the Gilded Age as part of the "Age of Laissez Nous Faire," and described how late nineteenth-century "exponents of laissez faire" like Cleveland invariably fell "into the quicksand of colonialism" at the turn of the century, even though Cleveland proclaimed himself to be a staunch anti-imperialist.
35 Revisionist historian Thomas McCormick has similarly described the foreign policy of Cleveland as the "imperialism of anti-imperialism," an updated version of "the mid-century British system of 'free-trade imperialism'," decked out "in an Uncle Sam suit." Thus, Cleveland's policy in the Pacific exemplified an American "free trade empire" because Cleveland's cabinets and advisors were desirous of new markets in Asia. Exemplifying the revisionist consensus-driven portrayal of Open Door imperialism, McCormick added that "Cleveland's 'free-trade imperialism' and McKinley's 'pragmatic expansionism' shared in common a great deal of intellectual real estate," such as the "industrial overproduction analysis," the "corollary commitment to marketplace expansionism," and the desire for "commercial Open Doors over closed colonies or spheres of influence."
36 Lumping Cleveland with McKinley and blurring the line between non-imperial market expansionism with informal imperialism, however, overlooks how McKinley, along with Harrison and Blaine before him, was a staunch protectionist who wantedindeed preferred-closed colonial markets and spheres of influence to an international free-swinging Open Door.
37 Protectionist opposition to Cleveland's anti-imperial foreign policy only further underscored the sizeable differences between free traders and economic nationalists regarding American global economic expansion. While Anglo-Saxonism, upholding the Monroe Doctrine, and a desire for new markets certainly motivated Cleveland's foreign policy, it remains problematic to place such actions within a free-trade imperial framework.
The missing piece to the Cleveland anti-imperial puzzle is found in both his administrations' adherence to Cobdenism, sometimes referred to as the "Manchester School," the utopian belief that free trade and non-interventionism would bring about world peace. Until recently, however, scholars of turn-of-the-century American imperialism, revisionist and non-revisionist alike, have overlooked the 35. Williams, Tragedy, [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] 29, [46] [47] Williams, Contours of American History, 341. 36. McCormick, China Market, 45, 63, 35, 77, 184, 105. 37 . Hugh de Santis briefly notes this contradiction in "The Imperialist Impulse and American Innocence, 1865-1900," in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review (Westport, CT, 1981), 71.
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38 McCormick proves a notable exception, observing that "in analytical terms, Cleveland and his supporters simply echoed the mid-century tenets of Great Britain's 'free-trade imperialism'," their rhetoric reminiscent of Cobden's speeches.
39 While acknowledging the Cobdenite influence on Cleveland's administration, McCormick's revisionist interpretation nevertheless brushes aside the strong anti-imperial dimensions of Cobdenism, as well as the prolific Cobdenite anti-imperial scholarship within British imperial historiography. As a result, the Cobdenite Cleveland administrations have long remained an anti-imperial anomaly.
40
Revisionist attempts to place Cleveland and his anti-imperial Cobdenites alongside their imperial Republican predecessors and successors are eerily reminiscent of the early disagreements surrounding the Gallagher-Robinson thesis. Particularly, in 1962 Oliver MacDonagh countered "the imperialism of free trade" thesis with that of "the anti-imperialism of free trade." He persuasively argued that the foremost British adherents to the Victorian free-trade ideology known as Cobdenism were inherently opposed to informal and formal imperialism alike.
41 American Cobdenites shared the anti-imperial free-trade sentiments of their British counterparts. Furthermore, Cleveland and his Cobdenite cabinets time and again thwarted Republican annexationism, militarism, and informal imperial policies throughout the 1880s and 1890s, all while also attempting to ameliorate the Republican protectionist system by instituting freer trade at home. Their Cobdenite bona fides were put on further display when they became leading antiimperial opponents of the Spanish-American War and of the subsequent acquisition of an American colonial empire. The free-trade policies of the Cleveland administrations are better described as anti-imperial: Cobdenite policies that contrasted sharply with his imperial Republican predecessors and successors.
This contrast was made even more visible soon after Republican William McKinley entered the White House in early 1897. He quickly sought to overturn Cleveland's Cobdenite foreign policy and reemploy Republican economic nationalism. President McKinley, whose 1896 campaign slogan had been "protection and reciprocity," was by now a full-fledged fan of foreign markets, requesting that "especial attention should be given to the reenactment and extension of the reciprocity principle of the law of 1890, under which so great a stimulus was given to 42 With an eye toward the markets of Latin America and Europe, in 1897 the McKinley administration promptly replaced the more moderate Wilson-Gorman Tariff with the Dingley Tariff, raising average import tariffs from 41.2 percent to 47.6 percent. It was replete as well with a new set of reciprocity provisions that allowed the president to place items on the free list (without consent from Congress); to lower tariffs with signatories on an individual basis by no more than 20 percent (with congressional consent); and to institute retaliatory duties against countries that subsidized exports destined for the United States. In selling the new tariff, McKinley suggested that protectionism should now "be employed to extend and promote our market abroad."
43
Soon to follow this bit of economic nationalist legislation was a declaration of war against Spain. The formal and informal American Empire acquired from the Spanish-American War was obtained primarily owing to the efforts of the country's more progressive economic nationalists, and against the loud protestations of American Cobdenites as well as some home-market protectionists (see Figure 1) . Although McKinley himself was initially reluctant to declare war on Spain, his lifelong patriotic defense of the American System would 46 The limited acquiescence of the European powers to the American request merely illustrated that the United States had gained a notable imperial status in the decade since the McKinley Tariff's passage. It was not, however, a sudden Republican appeal to free-trade principles or out of "respect for free trade." As Paul Wolman has observed, the Open Door was by no means a "free trade conception."
47
The Open Door in Asia found its economic nationalist counterpart in the 1897 Dingley Tariff's reciprocity provision. More progressive protectionist elementswho John Kasson called "reasonable" protectionists and who oppositional homemarket protectionists disparagingly termed "half-breeds"-came to Republican reciprocity's quasi-liberal defense. For example, NAM and the National Association of Agricultural Implements and Vehicle Manufacturers lobbied strongly for Kasson's reciprocity treaties. As a further bulwark against homemarket attacks, however, McKinley's treasury secretary, Leslie Shaw, clearly denied that the reciprocity provision was "a step toward free trade, but the natural handmaiden of protection."
48
Amid growing "half-breed" Republican support for reciprocity as well as continued resistance from "stalwart" Republican home-market protectionists who yet opposed accessing foreign markets, Kasson continued to work on behalf of the Republican administration's protectionist reciprocity policy. He received support at the 1901 National Reciprocity Convention from F. B. Thurber, a representative of the U.S. Export Association, who called upon the seeming pro-reciprocity majority within the protectionist camp to overrule the home-market Republican opposition, as "reciprocity affords an opportunity to reform the tariff by its friends, which, if not embraced, may result in a tidal wave of free-trade sentiment which will be disastrous to all our industries." reciprocity. He preferred the latter, alongside massive increases to the army and navy. 50 Former Republican Secretary of State John W. Foster likewise applauded retaliatory reciprocity. He also lavished praise upon Hay's Open Door Notes and McKinley's "wise and prudent" act of sending U.S. troops into China, "a country with which we were nominally at peace, without the constitutional warrant of legislation by Congress," in order to "arbitrarily determine the destiny of a great empire." 51 In December 1901, now-President Theodore Roosevelt reiterated: "reciprocity must be treated as the handmaiden of protection."
52 John Kasson himself-both as reciprocity Special Commissioner Plenipotentiary and following his resignation amid continued senatorial opposition to the reciprocity treaties-staunchly defended the Dingley Tariff's reciprocal provisions to "stalwart" home-market protectionist opponents. He emphasized the silver lining, particularly that artificially high duties had actually been placed on goods for the sole purpose of maintaining "the possibility and necessity of reducing them" under section four of the tariff act.
53 He would thereafter go on to help direct the National Reciprocity League (NRL), most of its members being "naturally protectionists."
54 Although Kasson's own reciprocity treaties were suffering "a quiet death" by senatorial hands owing to opposition from free traders, as well as from home-market protectionist stalwarts, "protection and reciprocity" would remain the preferred policy approach toward U.S. imperial expansion for Republican presidents in the years to come.
55 Thus, while appearing paradoxical at first glance, the Open Door's expansionist designs were quite in keeping with progressive Republican adherence to protective tariffs, retaliatory reciprocity, and colonial closed doors (see Figure 2) .
Transatlantic free traders quickly picked up on the Open Door's warped protectionist frame, and puzzled over the seeming paradox. During the 1900 presidential campaign, for example, American free traders at once attacked Republican closed-door Filipino policies and condemned the Dingley Tariff. University of Chicago economist Robert Franklin Hoxie explained away the Open Door's perceived contradictions by observing that the past four years had witnessed a "progressive reconciliation" between protectionism and imperialism. an Open Door in China while keeping American doors closed to Chinese immigrants.
58
British free traders were similarly critical of the so-called Open Door. British Cobdenite Charles Dilke worried (correctly as it turned out) that the introduction of the U.S. "Protective system" in the Caribbean would likely carry over to the newly acquired American colonies in the Pacific. Protectionism in the Philippines, he noted, would then undermine the McKinley administration's ostensible call for an open-door policy in China. It was this "uncertainty concerning the future colonial and foreign policy of the United States" that held Anglo-American cooperation in China in the balance: "It is evident that the imposition in the Philippines of a Protective system . . . would cause an outcry against the consistency or sincerity of a Power which, closing the door itself . . . was going to China with us on behalf of the Open Door." 59 U.S. colonial tariff policy in the Philippines clearly outlined the Open Door's protectionist frame (see Figure 3) . From 1898 to 1902 the Philippines, despite its dependent colonial status, received the same tariff treatment as would a foreign country. J. B. Foraker, Republican senator from Ohio, among many others, argued forcefully against free trade in the Philippines, as such a policy would allow for the free flow of Asian immigrants and competitive global exports, thereby leading to "the overthrow of our protective tariff." Under the subsequent U.S. Revenue Act of 1902, Philippine exports to the United States were given a 25 percent discounted tariff rate. New York Senator Frank D. Pavey, a supporter of a prohibitive tariff against the Philippines so long as the insurgency of Aguinaldo continued, stated that any "Open Door to the world's commerce" in the Philippines would remain "a political myth."
60
American and Filipino free-trade critics of the U.S. closed-door policy in the Philippines thereafter garnered support from a rather unusual source: the Episcopal Church. In 1906, Charles H. Brent, the Episcopalian Bishop of the Philippine Islands, attacked the so-called "splits" tax, which placed a 100-percent surtax on cheap, low-quality, textiles from England. Enacted following the lobbying efforts of the American cotton textile industry, its purpose was to encourage Filipino consumption of American-made textiles. But it resulted in pushing already poor Filipinos further into poverty by forcing them to purchase the more expensive American cotton fabrics. The American Anti-Imperialist League and many U.S.
Episcopal bishops duly seconded Brent's free-trade call. Alternatively, the protectionist publication of the U.S. cotton textile industry, the Textile World Record, imperialistically defended the tax by paternalistically deeming it "a trifling detail" that helped alleviate the burdensome U.S. guardianship over those "brown men in the Philippines," who were unable to govern themselves.
61
Congress would once again revise its closed-door policy in the Philippines in 1909 with the passage of the Philippine Tariff Act. The new act, alongside the Payne-Aldrich Tariff, eliminated tariffs on U.S.-Philippine trade while also levying duties on non-U.S. imports into the Philippines in order to minimize foreign competition.
62 Protectionist proponents of U.S. imperial control over the Philippine tariff policy, such as Harold M. Pitt of the Manila Chamber of (Washington, 1909) ; Wolman, Most Favored Nation, [15] [16] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocity, ; Pedro E. Abelarde, American Tariff Policy towards the Philippines, 1898 -1946 (New York, 1947 ; Culbertson, "Open Door and Colonial Policy," 334.
Commerce, argued that U.S. command of Filipino industry and commerce was "gradually binding up the destiny of the Philippine Islands . . . inseparably with our own." Why? Because the "Payne bill . . . gives American products blanket protection in Philippine markets and Philippine products a sort of limited, half-hearted preference" in the United States. Pitt also pointed out that this protectionist Filipino policy would ultimately furnish "the means with which to gain control of the trade of China."
63
The American Protective Tariff League, for once in agreement with AngloAmerican free-trade critics, happily noted that the U.S. colonial trade policy in the Philippines was antithetical to the Open Door. "When a Tariff policy is being formed for one it should be adapted to the other," the league argued. "We cannot have Free-Trade with the Philippines and hold the door open to trade between the islands and China without the practical abandonment of our Protective policy." The McKinley administration's actions toward Puerto Rico in 1900 laid the groundwork for subsequent American protectionist policies toward its newfound formal and informal colonial acquisitions. As the American Protective Tariff League's news organ the American Economist described it: "No question that has been before Congress during . . . any recent session has caused greater interest among the leaders of both parties." McKinley had initially favored a more liberal trade policy with Puerto Rico, to fiscally treat it "like Oklahoma and Alaska." The administration quickly reversed this decision, however, upon the realization that such a precedent would play out throughout the new colonies, putting the U.S. market in direct competition with Cuban tobacco and sugar growers, "shrewd, cheap" Filipino labor, and a potential deluge of foreign exports and Asian immigration. As a spokesman for the McKinley administration put it: "He don't want any legislation for Puerto Rico that will keep us from legislating for Manila."
65
The U.S. government therefore maintained paternalistic imperial control over Puerto Rico's tariff policy (see Figure 4) . 66 The Republican administration correspondingly ignored American and Puerto Rican calls for free trade, and instead instituted a tariff policy derived from the Dingley Tariff, offering a discounted tariff (15 percent) on Puerto Rican exports to the United States. Anti-imperialists promptly condemned this protectionist decision to treat Puerto Rico "in a manner different from . . . an organized Territory of the United States," calling it "the entering wedge of 'imperialism'." Critics and proponents alike viewed the new Puerto Rican tariff policy as "doubtless the most momentous that has come up since the Civil War." Whereas "every paper which opposed expansion has loudly urged Free-Trade . . . every supporter of expansion has supported the Puerto Rican Tariff," the American Economist observed with delight. The protectionist news organ was of course a supporter of the colonial tariff, warning detractors that "the imperialist principle will have to be accepted sooner or later." It also reiterated Gunton's Magazine's racialist demand that Puerto Rico and Hawaii "be permanently annexed as colonies, with no rights of American citizenship or statehood," so as to restrict immigration and foreign representation in Congress, and to set an imperial "precedent for Cuba, if it should eventually be annexed."
67 The subsequent bilateral trade proclamation of July 1901 allowing Puerto Rican exports duty-free entry into the United States unsurprisingly came attached with protectionist bounties for American sugar interests. "Clever Free-Trade and anti-imperialist strategists" may have "engineered" stiff opposition to the imperial Puerto Rican tariff, but they apparently were not clever enough. The Supreme Court's subsequent decisions concerning colonial tariff policy played a crucial role in expanding the American closed-door empire. British writer Sydney Brooks, having only just returned to England after a five-year stint in the United States, noted how the Supreme Court's May 27, 1901 decision had legalized the American empire. The first of the now-infamous Insular Cases "decreed" that the Constitution "does not follow the flag," by allowing McKinley and Congress to implement a protective tariff policy upon Puerto Rican goods. Brooks observed that this imperial tariff policy owed much to the "Protectionists to the bone" alongside a general racist fear of nonwhite immigration. "The American Empire," he wrote, "is a Protectionist Empire." Nor had the new tariff been made "for the benefit of Porto Rico . . . but to establish the principle, now ratified by the Supreme Court, that Imperialism did not imply free trade within the Empire." Erving Winslow, an officer of both the Anti-Imperialist League and the American Free Trade League, similarly recognized that the Puerto Rican decision meant that the Philippines would remain "outside the Constitution" and its tariff conditions "subject to the arbitrary power of Congress." 69 The rapidly developing Puerto Rican tariff policy duly became the protectionist lynchpin of Progressive Era economic imperialism, as it allowed for a disparate, protectionist, ad hoc imperial administration for each of the new territorial acquisitions.
With the frequent overlap of tariff and monetary issues, it should not come as a surprise that the era's leading dollar diplomats were likewise working within the Republican-devised economic nationalist imperial framework. In a matter closely tied with imperial tariff policy, Emily Rosenberg has explored how the initial attempt at gold-standard foreign currency reform also arose in Puerto Rico at this time. Puerto Rican planters and manufacturers acquiesced to the U.S.-controlled gold standard in 1901 in return for freer access to the American market. An early blueprint for the implementation of dollar diplomacy in the Pacific and in Latin America for decades to come had thus been drawn up. Rosenberg and the Wisconsin School have also directed renewed light upon U.S. "financial missionaries" like Charles Conant, who proved instrumental in extending U.S. fiscal control over its colonies and protectorates. 70 In keeping with the revisionists' turn-of-the-century laissez-faire depiction, it has also been suggested that Conant was "deeply imbued with a free-trade kind of competition in the 'struggle for commercial supremacy'," working within the "tradition of Adam Smith's capitalism." 71 On the contrary, Conant support for American imperialism deviated greatly from the Cobdenite classical liberal critique of imperialism. Conant granted that protectionism was useful to stimulate infant industries; he justified state control of railways and telegraphs; and he ideologically imbibed that progressive economic nationalist formula, protectionism mixed with reciprocity.
72 Dollar diplomacy and the imperialism of economic nationalism were tied together.
Along with having a direct impact upon American policies toward the Philippines, the imperial tariff decisions concerning Puerto Rico soon bled into the struggle from 1901 to 1903 over Cuban reciprocity. At the time, Laughlin and Willis described the struggle as a "new stage in the history of reciprocity." Upon his presidential succession, Roosevelt promised to continue his predecessor's reciprocal designs for Cuba, with the backing of the NRL. In his first annual message to Congress in 1901, Roosevelt therefore asked for the "application" of Cuban reciprocity owing to "weighty reasons of morality and national interest." He also expressed his private delight at the coercive idea of pulling Cuban politicaleconomic strings through reciprocity. 73 In February 1902, American Cobdenite Hazard Stevens conversely castigated Republican reciprocity "under protection auspices," which "leads to discrimination, retaliation, and war itself." The Dingley Tariff, he charged, was obstructing "real reciprocity," thereby proving "an effective abates in front of the fortress of protection." Boston's protectionist Home Market Club had long noted similar objections from the New England Free Trade League and "the general body of American Cobdenites."
74 A retaliatory reciprocity agreement with Cuba had previously been tried under the 1890 McKinley Tariff, to the mutual benefit of both signatories' exports. Cuban sugar exports to the United States came to a halt, however, owing to the lobbying efforts of American beet sugar growers during the crafting of the 1894 WilsonGorman Tariff. Following the war with Spain, Cuba's nominal independence was thereafter curtailed by the Platt Amendment of March 1901, which gave the United States the right to naval stations and military intervention, as afterward enacted in Cuba from 1906 to 1909.
The powerful U.S.-based Sugar Trust was reluctant to lose Cuba's potentially bountiful source of sugar, and Republican proponents of reciprocity like Roosevelt claimed it was the moral duty of the United States to provide freer trade to the Cubans (and by extension the U.S. Sugar Trust). A reciprocity treaty was therefore worked out between 1902 and 1903 that opened the Cuban market on a preferential basis with the United States, despite opposition both from protectionist American beet sugar growers (fearing Cuban competition), and from free-trade purists (see Figure 5) . 75 As a partial salve to U.S. sugar growers, however, the new Cuban treaty of 1903 included a discounted protective tariff on Cuban exports to the United States, in keeping with the Puerto Rican decision and in spite of Cuban and American calls for free trade. 76 In 1909, the Taft administration would thereafter replace the Cuban reciprocity treaty with a more stringent retaliatory tariff, effectively implementing a further closed-door policy that stunted Cuban economic independence and growth.
77 As Laughlin and Willis observed, Cuban reciprocity was "not based upon free trade philosophy," but instead assumed "the form in which it was denounced by President Cleveland . . . as a device for entangling our revenue system with that of foreign countries for the purpose of territorial expansion, or national aggrandizement."
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After twelve years under the Dingley Tariff, the Taft administration's progressive 1909 Payne-Aldrich Tariff gave the American closed-door policy a gentle protectionist push. The new tariff allowed for a maximum-minimum tariff schedule; a lowering of duties on imports from countries that reciprocated with nondiscriminatory tariffs on American goods; a retaliatory increase of 25 percent on imports from countries that discriminated against the United States; and a clause allowing for the president to appoint a special tariff commission to determine the tariff's application. Although Taft was a proponent of freer trade with the Philippines and slight downward tariff revisions generally, he stuck to his protectionist principles. 79 Thus, according to David Lake, Taft's 1909 tariff once again "eschewed liberal free-trade principles" by means of "the coercive power of high tariffs" for the exploitation of foreign markets, despite a slightly less illiberal policy of nondiscrimination (of course excluding colonial tariff policies), alongside slightly lower average import duties (41 percent), and an expanded free list. Tariff expert Frank Taussig explained the tariff a few years after its passage: nondiscrimination did not mean "the same thing as to adopt a policy of laissez faire in foreign trade." The American Free Trade League's Free Trade Broadside reported that retaliatory reciprocity had reached "its high water mark." Prominent protectionist John Ball Osborne confirmed this assessment the myth of the laissez-faire state, wherein the United States set forth on a bipartisan, free-trade imperial mission to forcibly gain access to foreign markets. Such consensus-driven open-door imperial analyses nevertheless fall short of effectively explaining U.S. expansion in an era dominated by economic nationalist policies at home and abroad. No political consensus came into existence surrounding American imperialism, the ill-named Open Door, or Republican retaliatory reciprocity. Rather, the haphazard turn-of-the-century American Empire arose amid great politico-ideological conflict, and arose owing to the imperialism of economic nationalism. Political rifts within and between the Republican and Democratic parties over American imperialism continued unabated, even as economic nationalist ideology continued to permeate the U.S. political economy and Republicanled imperial expansion.
83 In particular, Republican imperialism of economic nationalism encountered strong opposition from both stalwart home-market protectionists and American free traders, and was temporarily halted in the mid1890s owing to the anti-imperial Cobdenite policies enacted under President Grover Cleveland.
Only in areas beyond American influence did the Republican call for the Open Door apply, and only nominally at that. Thus, the United States knowingly and purposefully did not apply the principles of the Open Door to its own newly acquired colonial markets. Instead, these markets remained effectively closed to the rest of the world, as did much of the protected U.S. domestic market. Republican presidential victories throughout the 1920s would usher in the final years of any concerted implementation of the imperialism of economic nationalism, a Republican imperial program that was quite distinct from either President Woodrow Wilson's idealistic free-trade vision, or the subsequent neoliberal reciprocity regime begun in the 1930s under the supervision of FDR's secretary of state, Cordell Hull. 
